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Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the relationship between the 
United States and Russia has regained the attention of America in ways not seen since the 
final days of the Cold War. Romania, a nation historically embattled between the East 
and West, positions itself as a stalwart ally of the United States against a resurgent 
Russia. To understand the motivations of each actor, one must be keenly aware of both 
the history and the culture of each side. As the United States navigates into unforeseen 
waters piloted by the Trump administration, a possible battle on the Black Sea appears 
imminent, if not in military might then certainly in ideology. This thesis explores the past 
interactions of Romania, the United States, and Russia through an historical perspective 
in order to analyze present motivations. An attempt to understand intentions behind 
actions may prove helpful in preventing a possible flashpoint on the Black Sea and a 
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In the wake of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the advent of a major United States 
Navy anti-missile base in Romania has implications for the policy, strategy, and 
operations of the U.S. Navy in a moment of great strategic turmoil in the Pacific and the 
Atlantic. This thesis takes a lead from the need within the U.S. Navy Strategic Enterprise, 
that is, the attempt by the Chief of Naval Operations to strengthen strategic thought and 
practice in the brains of the Navy. To this end, the inquiry seeks to determine the 
character of Romanian foreign, security, and defense policy as pertains to the Black Sea 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This work further assesses the impact of the 
Ukraine crisis, and the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Romania as these 
issues have an impact on the U.S. armed forces and NATO. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ROMANIAN AND BLACK SEA  
In its progress from the socialist camp to NATO and the European Union from 
1989 until the present, Romania has undergone impressive reforms economically, 
politically and militarily, all in an effort to modernize and become more westernized.1 
These reforms paid off with the membership of NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. 
Romania has ushered in a new age of democracy and security in a relatively short period. 
As a casualty of the worst effects of the two World Wars and Cold War, Romania is a 
critical, often-overlooked European country that stands at the front of a region amid an 
international crisis: the South Central and Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea.2 With the 
deteriorating security situation in Europe, it is as important as ever for those in the U.S. 
Navy charged with Eurasian security to understand the policy and capabilities of 
Romania, as well as the growing unrest in the Black Sea region as a whole.  
In the wake of membership under the Washington Treaty, NATO and the United 
States have continued to strengthen relationships with Romania in the realms of policy 
                                                 
1 Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International Socialization after the 
Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 169. 
2 Robert Kaplan, In Europe’s Shadow: Two Cold Wars and a Thirty-Year Journey Through Romania 
and Beyond (New York: Random House, 2016), 29–31. 
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but also that of armament. As part of the construction of an anti-missile forward defense 
directed against Iran or a like power, in December 2016, Aegis Ashore, an U.S. anti-
ballistic missile defense base opened in Deveselu, Romania.3 Furthermore, Romania has 
agreed to host anti-ballistic missiles in country. A vital part of NATO’s plan for a 
European missile shield, Romania’s actions have provoked Russian aggression.  
In an area of increasing instability because of Russian aggression as well as the 
geopolitical collapse of the Middle East in the wake of the Iraq campaign, Romania is 
becoming a lynchpin of the Black Sea. Russia perceives the Black Sea region and much 
of Eastern Europe as under its self-proclaimed sphere of influence. After a conflict in 
Georgia, an ongoing hybrid war in Ukraine, an annexation of Crimea, and a show of 
power in the Syrian War, Russia is extending its reach and projecting influence in a 
contested area of the Europe.4 After the attempted coup in Turkey, Romania remains the 
most dependable ally in the Black Sea region. 
While U.S. defense funding, assets, and action shifted to the Pacific theater, many 
argue that there is a renewed Cold War brewing in Europe. The rising number of terrorist 
attacks in Europe in 2015–2017, Brexit, the military coup in turkey, and increased 
aggression in Russian rhetoric all seemingly point to a growing unrest in the status quo. 
Besides the opening of Aegis Ashore in Romania, the United States has shifted four 
Aegis destroyers to Rota, Spain, and has plans to open another Aegis Ashore in Poland, 
as well as station an X-Band Radar site in Turkey.5 U.S. Naval personnel who will serve 
in Romania must understand the strategic as well as civil military context of their service 
in this NATO ally and in the region, overall.  
                                                 
3 “Key Missile Defence Site Declared Operational,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified 
May 12, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_130721.htm.  
4 Thomas Frear, Ian Kearns, and Lukasz Kulesa, “Preparing for the Worst: Are Russian and NATO 
Military Exercises Making War in Europe more Likely?” European Leadership Network, last modified 
August 7, 2015, 3–4, 
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/08/07/ea2b8c22/Preparing%20for%20the%
20Worst.pdf. 
5 North Atlantic Council, “Warsaw Summit Communique,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last 
modified August 3, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been an inconsistency in the literature concerning Romania’s 
importance to Black Sea regional security in the past few decades. The information that 
has been found is mostly contained in journal articles, statements, government bulletins, 
and briefings. Since the early 2000s, literature has steadily increased with Romania’s 
participation in wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Literature was more abundant as 
Romania was admitted into NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. Then, with Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and the opening of Aegis Ashore in Deveselu, new literature can be 
found daily. Not surprisingly, the increase in writing has been directly proportional to the 
exponential increase in action in Romania and the Black Sea, with attempts being made 
to gain an understanding of the area as key to European Security.  
The leading schools of thought concerning Romania and the Black Sea can 
essentially be separated into two groupings. It may be useful to look at the case of 
Romania through the realist’s lens as a classic security dilemma. Romania, as throughout 
its history, is directly in the middle of a conflict between the powers and influence of the 
West versus the power and influence from Russia.6 As in any conflict, the two sides have 
opposing perceptions of each other’s actions.  
The first theme, and what seems to be the most prevalent, is that Russia has been 
increasing its aggression in a bid to reassert itself not only in the Black Sea region, but on 
the world stage as well. Coinciding with this viewpoint is the firm stance that any action 
by Romania and NATO is purely defensive in nature. NATO leaders reiterated this theme 
most recently at the 2016 Warsaw Summit in July: 
Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the 
periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain 
political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional 
instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-
Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, 
free, and at peace. … Russia’s destabilising actions and policies include 
the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, which we do 
                                                 
6 Igor Delanoe and Sergei Konoplyov. “Continuities and Ruptures: Tracking the U.S. Interests in the Black Sea 




not and will not recognise and which we call on Russia to reverse; the 
violation of sovereign borders by force; the deliberate destabilisation of 
eastern Ukraine; large-scale snap exercises contrary to the spirit of the 
Vienna Document, and provocative military activities near NATO borders, 
including in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and the Eastern 
Mediterranean; it’s irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military 
concept and underlying posture; and its repeated violations of NATO 
Allied airspace.7  
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Romanian Prime Minister Dacian 
Ciolos, and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work met in May 2016, right 
before the Warsaw Summit at a press conference following the operationalization 
ceremony of Aegis Ashore in Romania. Specifically addressing the issue of Aegis in 
regard to perceptions of Russia, Prime Minister Ciolos stated, “This system is not 
directed against Russia…it is not an offensive system, it is a defensive system…it is 
legitimate for any country to allocate resources and to defend itself.”8 In the same press 
conference, Secretary General Stoltenberg addressed the issues of increasing NATO’s 
naval presence in the Black Sea affirming: 
We have already increased our naval presence in the Black Sea and we did 
so because we agreed that after the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia 
and the destabilizing behavior of Russia in Eastern Ukraine supporting the 
separatists we decided to implement what we call assurance measures in 
the Eastern part of the alliance.9 
NATO, Romania, and the U.S. view Russia’s aggression as a threat to regional 
security. To combat the aggression actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, NATO 
allies have increased presence in the Black Sea and bolstered defenses in ally countries. 
As part of the NATO Force Structure through the Adaptation Measures of Readiness 
Action Plan, NATO has established the “Headquarters of a Multinational Division 
Southeast in Romania to take command of the NATO Force Integration Units and to 
provide flexible command and control options in their regions.”10  
                                                 
7 North Atlantic Council, “Warsaw Summit Communique.” 
8 North Atlantic Council, “Joint Press Point,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last modified May 
13, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_130698.htm. 
9 Ibid. 
10 North Atlantic Council, “Warsaw Summit Communique.” 
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NATO maintains that the opening of Romania’s AEGIS Ashore and 
establishment of the Southeastern NATO Headquarters, are merely defensive actions to 
bolster a security whose status quo was upset by Putin who “dramatically altered the 
European security landscape,” according to NATO’s Gabriel Mallows.11 In a statement 
to the House Armed Services Committee, then-Commander of U.S. Forces Europe 
General Philip Breedlove, testified that “President Putin’s Russia has abandoned all 
pretense of participating in a collaborative security process with its neighbors and the 
international community.”12 
Russia’s perceived saber rattling is anything but, according to Russia’s viewpoint. 
The opposing theme is that NATO is the aggressive actor and Russia’s actions are wholly 
defensive in reaction to a perceived western expansion. One only has to look at a map of 
NATO allies to understand the feeling of entrapment. Any move by NATO is seen as an 
infringement on Russia. 
As Mallows asserts, “Russia’s actions in Ukraine were, in the eyes of Russia and 
its defenders, defensive; Russia argues that NATO has been trying to encircle them since 
the end of the Cold War.”13 Russia’s 2014 doctrine frequently uses the terms 
“neighbourhood” not explicitly naming specific states but rather “states bordering the 
Russian Federation” in reference to the perceived “need to defend what it sees as its vital 
sphere of influence.”14  
Whether warranted or not, perceptions hold an important place in Russian culture, 
a nation that places great importance on the image of strength. NATO, a creation during 
                                                 
11 Gabriel Mallows, “NATO’s Security Dilemma,” NATO Association of Canada, accessed August 
21, 2016, http://natoassociation.ca/natos-security-dilemma/. 
12 Philip Breedlove, “Statement of General Philip Breedlove,” U.S. European Command, Department 
of Defense, last modified February 25, 2015, http://www.eucom.mil/mission/background/posture-
statement. 
13 Mallows, “NATO’s Security Dilemma.” 
14 Polina Sinovets and Bettina Renz, “Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine and Beyond: Threat 




the Cold War, seemingly will always hold a stigma of an enemy to Russian no matter 
what declarations to the contrary are made.15 
To fully comprehend the intricacies of Romania and security in the Black Sea, 
one must develop a thorough understanding of perceptions, based on history and culture, 
from both sides. Only then can one begin to fully comprehend the motivations behind the 
actions. As in any security dilemma, the key will be in deciphering between acts engaged 
in fear mongering or grandstanding and acts that may represent something more serious. 
If the aim is to prevent another Cold War, the correct interpretation will be vital.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
After an initial investigation into the research for the thesis and a careful 
examination of the primary themes, two potential hypotheses stand out. The first is that 
each side, the West and Russia, have perceived aggression from the other and in reaction 
are bolstering their defenses and upping their rhetoric to gain influence on the world 
stage. These acts while worrisome will merely result in a careful balancing and settled 
status quo in Eastern Europe. Black Sea fleets on the western and eastern coasts will 
increase in their size and frequency of operations. Yet, with common interests in the area, 
diplomatic talks may lead to increased cooperation between the West and Russia.16 
The second explanation, and currently more likely, is that acts of aggression will 
continue to be perceived as such. A build-up will occur but will not end peacefully or 
with any aims at coordination. The U.S. will continue to protect its interests in the area 
and devote more resources to NATO, Romania, and Eastern Europe. Russia will continue 
its war in Ukraine and most likely seek to assert its influence further west. This is clearly 
the more dangerous result and may bring about renewed conflicts between old Cold War 
rivals.17  
                                                 
15 Roland Dannreuther, “Russian Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance,” North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 1, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/dannreut.pdf. 
16 Robert Pszczel, “How NATO Is Perceived in Russia (Or Lessons in Optimism),” North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, accessed August 21, 2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/nato_russia/lessons-
optimism/EN/index.htm. 




D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The most appropriate research method for this thesis will use a qualitative 
approach within a strong historical context. Using the timeframe from the establishment 
of Romania, through both World Wars and into the Cold War, the Romanian Revolution 
of 1989, signaling the end of communism in Romania and in the years indicating the end 
of the Cold War, up until present day will offer a view of Romania’s evolution as pertains 
to current issues. Examining political and military trends in Romania and the Black Sea 
Region within a historical context of events in not only Europe but Russia as well will 
offer a foundation for comparative analysis. U.S., NATO, Romanian and Russian views 
will be identified so as to build a comprehensive analysis in order to gain an 
understanding of both sides.  
Scholarly publications will be examined for facts and opinions popular in the 
parties involved. The research will rely upon government as well as non-governmental 
organization documents and transcripts to gain an understanding of the policies and 
strategies underlying the major issues at play. Articles from well-informed foreign and 
domestic news agencies will also be utilized to form a basis of the perceptions of actors 
in the area. Together these types of materials will form a well-rounded research for the 
thesis, taking into account Western and Russian perceptions. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will contain chapters on the major influences in Romania and the Black 
Sea as well as chapters containing the differing historical and cultural perspectives of 
actors involved. The first chapter will be the introduction outlining the history of 
Romania in regard to the effects on current issues. Following the introduction will be 
chapters on Romania’s evolution in NATO and the European Union as well as the 
relationship specifically with that of the United States. In addition, a chapter will discuss 
current issues and conflicts from the western perspective and then that of the Russian 
perspective. The final chapter and conclusion will provide implications for future Black 
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II. ROMANIA: HISTORY AND POLITICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Romania has emerged as a steadfast ally to the U.S. and as an enthusiastic 
member to NATO. Serving alongside through joint operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and now upon the completion of a permanent U.S. Navy base in Deveselu, members of 
the U.S. military must be aware of the historical context and cultural perspective that has 
guided Romanians to the position they enjoy today. It is impossible to understand the 
relationship between the west and Romania without a thorough examination of 
Romania’s past. From the beginnings to the development as a nation-state, from the 
Revolution of 1848 to World War I and II, and through Romanian communism to a return 
to Europe, Romania’s history is one of choices and identity. Continuously confronted by 
a choice between the West and East, Romania has made difficult decisions with regard to 
what is best for Romania.  
B. THE BEGINNINGS OF A ROMANIA 
The long-term trend of Romanian people caught in the middle between the East 
and the West harkens back to the very genesis of what would become Romania. 
Encounters between the Thracians and Dacians, first with Greek cities along the Black 
Sea coast and later with the Romans during conquest in the second century AD would 
influence the area bounded by the Danube, Tisza, and Dniester Rivers.18 Upon absorption 
into the Roman Empire, the province of Dacia as it became knows, underwent a steady 
Romanization. All aspects of civilization adapted to the way of Roman society; 
government and its laws and judicial system, social and economic foundations, and 
religious practices, all became Roman. Roman was not the only influence though; Slavs 
from the north migrated into areas along the Danube and formal church institutions 
adopted Slavic as the official language of the church. The territory eventually formed into 
the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, with people known as Romanians, and the 
                                                 




province of Transylvania, which was part of the Hungarian Empire. Transylvania’s 
destiny would be different though, as the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia stood 
in the path of the Ottoman Turkish armies of conquest.  
Gradually assimilating to Ottoman rule, the Byzantine culture influenced the 
Romanian’s religion, culture, politics and economy. The Orthodox rule was broad but the 
principalities were never truly isolated from the West. Educated people were always 
aware of their Roman origins. Under conquest again, this time by Hungary, the 
principalities sought help from outside, Romanians would ask themselves whether they 
should turn to the west or to the east. Transylvania would follow the eastern model and 
set up “an authoritarian secular power and a single, dominant church.”19 Wallachia 
would appeal to the West and sought help directly from Pope Urban V.20 Allegiances 
eventually fell as Ottoman supremacy reigned. For a brief period, all three principalities 
of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia were united under Prince of Wallachia, Mihai 
Viteazul The Brave, who would achieve his grand design. Although the union would be 
short-lived, his boldness would become “a symbol of Romanian national destiny for 
generations of patriots in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”21  
In the seventeenth century, Romania would find itself torn between the Austrians, 
Russians, and Ottomans. Currents infiltrated the ruling class and the educated about 
where one’s place in history should be. After the Protestant Reformation and later the 
Renaissance, the seventeenth century “marked a crisis of conscience among both clerical 
and lay elites not unrelated to the political and economic turmoil that encompasses rulers 
and boiers.”22 People conscious of trends in Europe fostered the secular spirit in culture. 
Romanians would come to measure their success against that of the West. Historian Ivan 
Berend suggests that 
Eastern European reformers, comparing the situation of their own 
countries to that of the sparkling ideas and spectacular transformation of 
                                                 
19 Hitchins, Romania, 23. 
20 Ibid., 24. 
21 Ibid., 35. 
22 Ibid., 46. 
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the West, noticed the growing gap between the two and looked to the latter 
as a model to follow.23  
With this came a language-reform movement “in the service of nation building.”24 A 
major event fostering the idea of the nation was the Act of Union in 1701, with the 
Orthodoxy clergy and faithful recognizing the Pope of Rome.25 Perhaps the most 
important consequence of the Union was the idea of a Romania identity. The community 
of clergy saw the church as a bridge between the East and West:  
They conceived of nation in ways that differed fundamentally from the 
privileged communities represent by the three nations; the nation the 
clergy served was ethnic, and it encompassed all Romanians, even if 
social distinctions remained strong.26 
As much as the return to Rome united the people, they still clung to the eastern cultural 
and religious heritage and therefore were “utterly opposed to making their Greek Catholic 
Church more Latin.”27 Despite internal struggles of identity, the principalities of 
Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania stood on the threshold of modernity. As 
European ideas and behavior infiltrated society, people “strove to reconcile their Eastern 
heritage with Western innovation.”28 
C. ROMANIA: FROM REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR 
The nineteenth century in ways was the perfect storm for Central Europe. 
European great powers attempting to exert their influence confronted a weakened 
Ottoman Empire, which internally affected the way Romanians thought about themselves 
and what path to development and eventually independence they should take. Russia was 
most aggressive fighting three victorious wars against the Ottomans and eventual defeat 
                                                 
23 Ivan T. Berend, History Derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 3. 
24 Ibid., 51. 
25 Hitchins, Romania, 59–60. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 61. 
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of Napoleon, establishing itself as an “informal protectorate over [Romanians].”29 Yet 
culturally, western Europeans were winning the battles. Through the European 
Enlightenment, Romanians embraced their history; “they were European also in their 
embrace of Rome and Roman civilization, thereby joining in the revival of the classical 
tradition.”30 A youth movement formed, founded as the Junimea movement with 
reformers who “accepted the need for Rumania to evolve toward a modern civilization on 
the Western model.”31 A dream of a Greater Romania was growing. As Hitchins 
contends, “To liberals, the West was a source of inspiration, to the conservatives a cause 
of anxiety, as both sides warmed to the debate over national identity and paths of 
development.”32 Literature and poetry flourished in population centers on the rise, 
reflecting ideas of national unity and sympathy to the lower classes.33 Enthusiasm mixed 
with patriotism resulted in the revolution of 1848, resulting in a kind of liberalism 
henceforth known as Forty-Eightism.34 Bucharest was occupied by Turkish troops who 
quickly shut down the call for a new order, which was kept suppressed by Russian troops 
who remained in the principality until 1851.35 Their claim though, that “equal political 
rights followed naturally from the sharing of a common history and membership in the 
same ethnic community” would be cemented in the national thought.36 Supporting the 
Junimea movement, the romantic glorification of the past hero, Prince Mihai The Brave 
“was by no means accidental, but mirrored perfectly the heightened pre-occupation with 
national unity and independence.”37 The year 1848, despite the unsuccessful protests, in 
many ways marked Romania’s integration into Europe.  
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The dream of the Forty-Eighters would be realized in a strange chain of events 
culminating from the Crimean War. The victors of the war imposed on Russia in the 
Treaty of Paris, signed March 30, 1856, a sovereignty that prevented any single power 
from interfering in the principalities.38 A serious consequence from the Treaty was the 
cessation of the territory of Bessarabia to Moldavia from Russia. With Russia no longer 
bordering the Danube, the “Tsar felt the loss of territory as a personal affront and was 
committed to recovering it.”39 Russia only recently acquired the Bessarabian territory 
under the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 following the defeat Napoleon.40 Although during 
that time, the citizens of Moldavia and the other principalities for that matter “were 
painfully aware of the relentless Russification to which an authoritarian, centralizing 
regime had subjected the Orthodox Church, education, and cultural life, but they had no 
means of reversing the integration of the province.”41  
As the mental awareness clarified following the Crimean War, the use of the word 
Romania surpassed the individual principalities and eventually in 1866, Romania adopted 
a formal constitution. Unclarified was the relationship with Russia. Relations were 
strained as Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire, and Romania was left out of 
negotiations at the Congress of Berlin to draw up the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878.42 
While the treaty recognized the independence of Romania, it however, required the return 
of Bessarabia to Russia, since the territory had been ceded to Moldavia that ceased to 
exist under the current realization of Romania.43 Russia would integrate Bessarabia into 
the Empire as fully as possible. “Romanian intellectual and cultural life stagnated as 
Russia became the language of instruction in state schools and Romanian ceased to be a 
subject of study and as publications in Romanian were reduced to a trickle and literary 
creativity practically ceased.”44 Yet native language and tradition survived in the villages 
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and in the churches. As much, if not more than the 1848 Revolution, the conquests of 
Bessarabia would be leave a lasting imprint on the minds of Romanians until this present 
day.  
Still, Romania had earned its independence. The sudden realization had brought 
“politicians, economists, and social thinkers face to face with all the problems of national 
development.”45 Europeanists drew upon the western model, seeking industrialization 
and urbanization, while traditionalist desired to preserve the agricultural nature of 
Romania society. The factions that rejected the westernization were by no means small. 
In ways, it mirrored class distinctions. Educated elites looked toward the West as 
everyone else “declared Romania to be a country of peasant” and their “economic and 
social future as being inextricably linked to small, self-sufficient peasant holdings.”46 
The peasant way of life was forced to adapt through massive industrialization and 
commercialization of the agriculture sector, resulting in peasant uprisings. Political points 
of view differed with the debate never fully settled between those who embraced the 
somewhat radical change and those who feared Romania had “opened their doors too 
widely.”47 Soon continental events would force the Romanians to choose a direction. 
D. WORLD WARS 
Some will look back at the world wars as evidence the East and West forcing 
Romania to choose, however it would be more truthful to say Romania has been in the 
position of choosing since population centers first arose on the Danube. Nonetheless, the 
end of the nineteenth century saw fear and commitments on the rise. Romania had to 
decide with whom its alliance should take place. Public opinion leaned toward France, 
but the disdain shown to Romania at the Congress of Berlin raised doubts. Russia was not 
a viable option, since many in charge were liberals and thought of Russia as the enemy. 
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Romania admired Germany’s “economic vitality and military might” and therefore found 
the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy the most appealing.48  
1. The Triple Alliance 
Signed on October 30, 1883, the alliance with the Central Powers proved to be the 
cornerstone of Romanian foreign policy for three decades for the sole reason that 
Romanian King Carol and a few elites judged the Central Powers to be the most powerful 
alliance in Europe, and therefore most likely to guarantee security for Romania.49 Each 
member pledged to defend the other upon attack and to not enter into additional treaties 
with other nations. The alliance would be tested with the Balkan Wars. Threatened by the 
disruption of balance of power in the region, Romania entered into the Second Balkan 
war against the advisement of the allies. Romania performed well against Bulgaria, thus 
emerged over-confident, and with its territory enlarged. The Treaty of Bucharest in 
August of 1913 would signify the alienation of Romania from the Triple Alliance.50  
2. The Triple Entente 
Tsar Nicholas II would visit Constanta on June 14, 1914 marking the beginning of 
a new era of relations between Russia and Romania. Weeks later, Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo sparking the events leading to a century of 
destruction. Romania caught in the middle, while still entangled in the Triple Alliance 
would decide upon neutrality. After King Carol died in October of 1914, Romania 
remained set on neutrality until the course of the war played out and a winner became 
clear.51 Romania judged the Western Allies to be the winning side and sought the most 
beneficial guarantees from the Triple Entente before marching into war. It was not until 
nearly two years later that Romania was able to secure acceptable negotiations and 
officially entered into war August 17, 1916. The allies were less concerned with 
Romania’s national aspirations and more concerned with using the Romanian army to 
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open up another battlefront against the Central Powers. The Romanians’ ideas of 
increased territory and a reimagined Kingdom of Romania faded quickly as within four 
months German troops occupied Bucharest as well as half of the country.52 Events far 
away from Romania determined the end of the war but Romania, on the victorious side, 
was overly optimistic at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Prime Minister Ionel 
Bratianu was confident of gaining international recognition of new boundaries 
ascertained in the final months of the war as well as those promised in the treaty of 1916. 
However, the Big Four of Great Britain, France, the United States, and Italy, combined 
with Japan to form the Supreme Council and decided otherwise for Romania. Romania 
would not gain all the territory expected but did reacquire Bessarabia with details to be 
worked out between Romania and Russia. While relegated to second-tier status on the 
international stage, Romania moved forward and set upon repairing damage from the 
war, and integrating new provinces and citizens into the nation-state. 
3. Interwar Period 
Modern Romania arose from the turmoil of the First World War reaching it 
highest potential as a nation thus far. Perhaps the greatest achievement was the rise of the 
middle class. Although agriculture remained the foundation of Romania’s economy, 
industry and city centers grew to new levels creating a vibrant social and political life.53 
Yet, as quickly as Romania recreated itself, so did Germany as evidenced by the rise of 
Adolf Hitler. Romanian governments and politicians continued to align themselves with 
France and Great Britain as the dealers of peace in 1919; but as those countries continued 
to do little in the face of resurgent Germany, Romanian leaders became inclined to seek 
accommodations with Germany.54 A great debate in Romania arose, as intellectuals and 
newly minted political factions attempted to choose which direction Romania should 
steer for the next war. Europeanists and traditionalists fought with the former insisting 
there was no other choice but to take the urbanized path of social and economic 
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development, and the latter maintaining the agrarian character and unique heritage of the 
Romania identity. At least both sides could agree that Romania underwent significant 
change and growth in the interwar period. Yet, the economic collapse in the 1930s would 
bring to the forefront social and economic paths to success.  
4. Anti-Semitism and Dictatorships 
The depression would sharpen social tensions and raise questions of Romania’s 
national character, or more significantly, who was and was not Romanian. Anti-Semitism 
appealed to elements of society and was used by particular brands of nationalism.55 None 
was more prominent among these factions than the Iron Guard. Calling for a national 
rebirth based on simple, traditional values appealed to a generation of intellectuals. 
Democratic institutions could not withstand the attacks from within. Politicians saw the 
rise of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, all the while Western democracies sat idle. As 
Hitchins writes, “the Iron Guard seemed, to many of them, to be the embodiment of the 
youthful vitality needed to set the country on the way to returning to itself.”56 Ion 
Antonescu would arise as the spiritual leader of the Iron Guard, but it was the 
establishment of King Carol II’s dictatorship in 1938 that solidified Romania’s path 
toward destruction.57  
While authoritarian, Carol and his cabinet still saw the Paris Peace as the best way 
to secure Romania’s frontier in the face of Germany. That changed with the Munich 
agreement as France and Britain acquiesced in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. 
Closer relations with Germany were now essential to protect Romania’s borders. 
Romania chose Nazi Germany in part because of its deep-seated hostility with 
Communism and the Soviet Union. Romania felt more insecure than ever when the 
Soviets and Germans entered into the non-aggression pact of 1939. Unknown to Romania 
at the time was that Germany recognized the Soviet Union’s special interest in 
Bessarabia.  
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5. World War II 
Outbreak of war in 1939 and losses by the allies on the Western front convinced 
King Carol that the Allied cause was lost. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union struck to 
regain Bessarabia as Romania was forced to yield. Negotiations with Hitler’s Germany 
were underway but King Carol and his cabinet were being played against other Eastern 
European nations. August 30, King Carol decided to accept Hitler’s arbitration of 
Romania in exchange for a German military guarantee of new frontiers.58 Only after 
Hitler’s decision was formally announced did Romania realize it would lose a third of its 
territory and a third of its population. King Carol realized he failed to avert the country 
from disaster and appointed Iron Guard General Ion Antonescu to save Romania.  
Antonescu quickly took charge and his ambition to rule became readily apparent. 
Establishing a military dictatorship, Antonescu was regarded as Hitler’s second most 
important ally next to only Benito Mussolini of Italy.59 Antonescu willingly supplied 
Hitler’s war machine and when Germany turned against the Soviet Union, Antonescu 
declared a holy war to free Bessarabia from Soviet occupation.60 History sees 
Antonescu’s relationship with Hitler as ranging from a reluctant partner to willing 
accomplice. As Kaplan explains of Antonescu’s no less than ten visits with Hitler: 
Far from being overawed by the Fuhrer, Antonescu often contradicted him 
to his face, perhaps the only person ever allowed to do so, speaking his 
mind fully about Romania’s territorial interests for hours on end, so that 
Hitler came to respect him from the beginning of their relationship.61 
Antonescu would come to bear the sinister distinction of being responsible for the 
greatest number of Jewish deaths after only Hitler’s Germany.62 Antonescu’s reign 
would last until August 23, 1944, when the Red Army marched into Romania.63 The 
Soviets would convict and execute Antonescu at a prison outside of Bucharest. Upon 
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Antonescu’s removal from power, Romanians immediately switched sides and joined the 
Allied forces. For the remainder of the war, Romania would contribute more troops, 
538,000, to the Allied cause than any country outside of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States.64 Romania was in ways reluctant participants as the world fell 
apart around it, but also opportunistic accomplices in what would become a shameful 
segment in Romanian history. Kaplan bluntly summarizes: 
Self-interest dominates foreign policy thinking most of the time in most 
places. Yet rarely has national self-interest been applied so nakedly as by 
Romanian regimes during World War II, descending as it did to the level 
of sheer opportunism. It also bears repeating that the shamelessness 
Romania evinced during the war was, in turn, partly a function of its 
impossible geographical position, especially after Munich, when 
Chamberlain abandoned Central Europe to Germany. 
Although Romania switched sides and aided the Allies, it was very much a 
conquered nation occupied by the Soviet Union. Romania was forced to pay war 
reparations amounting to 300 million dollars to the Soviets who remained on Romanian 
territory.65 The Declaration of Liberated Europe, signed February 12, 1945, required that 
democratic elections be held but was largely ignored by the Soviet Union.66 Great Britain 
and the United States did little beyond protest, as their efforts were concentrated on 
rebuilding Western Europe and reaching a culminating point of victory against Japan. 
Therefore, through false elections and Soviet puppets, the Soviet government imposed its 
will upon Romania, ushering in the age of Communism.67 
E. ROMANIAN COMMUNISM 
What progress Romania made into nationhood and during the interwar period 
ceased to flourish under Soviet communism and the national identity of Romanians was 
nearly erased from memory. Although the United States and Great Britain denounced the 
elections as unrepresentative of the will of the people, was neither prepared nor willing to 
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go further. Hitchins contends, “Western influence on the course of events in Romania for 
all intents and purposes ceased.”68 
1. Severing Ties to the West 
As massive Soviet penetration into all walks of life occurred, any semblance of 
Western progress was halted. Kaplan states, “thus were centuries of history, national life, 
and cultural traditions ground up into dust.”69 Romania was rebuilt on the Stalin 
communist model. Dictator Gheorghiu-Dej took power in 1947 and installed a single, 
mass Communist Party movement, replacing even the appearance of democratic and 
traditional values and norms.70 To Romanians, the West had abandoned them to the will 
of the Soviets, their enemy and captor. Communism surged as secret police captured and 
killed citizens refusing to conform. Security troops were also in charge of the extensive 
prison network of over a hundred institutions modeled after Soviet gulags. Stalinism was 
implemented across industry, agriculture, banking, mining, and transport.71 Collective 
farms essentially enslaved the peasant class while censorship enslaved the intellectuals. A 
total police state was enforced and even after the Soviet Union underwent de-
Stalinization, Romania remained at heart a brutal Stalin-model regime.  
2. The Ceausescu Years 
On March 19, 1965, Gheorghiu-Dej died in office making way for Nicolae 
Ceausescu. If Romanians thought their lives would improve with a new leader, they were 
sorely mistaken. Kaplan tells of Ceausescu’s exploits as “Stalinist in ideology, totalitarian 
in it levels of repression, and nationalist in its appeal to the emotions of its population.”72 
With the goal of setting himself apart from the Soviet Union, Ceausescu took 
increasingly independent actions from that of the bloc. Ceausescu refused to break 
relations with Israel during the 1967 war, expanded interests in China, and outwardly 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 224.  
69 Kaplan, In Europe’s Shadow, 100. 
70 Ibid., 99. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 101. 
 
 21 
condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.73 Ceausescu was 
determined to pursue Romania’s self-determination in foreign policy. Western nations 
attempted to seize the opportunity to court Ceausescu and widen the gap between his 
agenda and his tense relations with Moscow.74 President Nixon would visit Ceausescu in 
Bucharest in 1969, and Romania would become a member of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).75 However, as 
Ceausescu pursued a course independent from Moscow, he would become emboldened 
by China and North Korea.  
Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, after travelling to China and North Korea became 
envious of the mass mobilizations and perfectly choreographed pageants. The Ceausescus 
embarked on plan to rebuild Romania on the North Korean model through a process of 
systemization. He was chiefly concerned with his grip on Romanian power and his image 
as an international actor. The Ceausescus became obsessed with creating a new order 
built on Marxist-Leninist ideals. The Ceausescus used Romania as their personal 
dictatorship, with images and statues of them in constant view. Ceausescu began to trust 
only his family members in an arrogant display of nepotism, as he raised his wife to a 
position of power second to only his, and prepared his son to succeed him.76 Western 
powers began to see Ceausescu as a useful containment method to the Soviet Union but 
none of this improved the lives of the Romanian people, and they would soon revolt 
against him. 
3. 1989 Revolution 
Opposition to Ceausescu built up in the decade prior to his downfall. Strikes, 
demonstrations, and attacks on party buildings showed the will of the people. Insulating 
himself from reality, Ceausescu promoted the use of force instead of dialogue in dealing 
with the many grievances. In December of 1989, unrest spread rapidly as workers, young 
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people, and the general populace poured onto the streets. Ordering his security forces to 
crush the rebellion by whatever means necessary, Ceausescu underestimated the power or 
at least the will of the people. Not fully comprehending the danger, Ceausescu organized 
a rally to speak to the party faithful. As large crowds rushed the square where the 
Ceausescus were speaking, television crews captured the moments when Ceausescu 
realized his mistake. Cheers quickly turned to boos and the Ceausescus were flown to 
safety by helicopter only to be picked up by army units and tried on charges of genocide. 
The Ceausescus were found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed December 25, 
1989.77 This would in way mark the beginning of a new era in Romanian history. 
F. RETURN TO EUROPE 
The 1990s would come to be referred to as the “return to Europe.” While true in 
some aspects it is more of a slogan as the Iron Curtain was more porous than originally 
thought. Intellectuals never forgot what Romania had worked so hard to become and in 
ways, the brutal nineteenth century cemented the will to return to an independent, 
forward-thinking Romania. In the years following communism, there were those in 
power who had to adjust to a new way of life, and some who questioned, as always, 
which direction to turn. Nonetheless, the majority wanted to reconnect with the West and 
bring Romania back from the brink. Elections were held and leaders put in place to 
establish a prosperous democratic Romania. While corruption was rampant, the direction 
was clear and Romania made important steps to assure the correct path was taken. The 
security and economy were driving factors in steering newly elected President Iliescu 
toward the West.  
In 1993, Romania signed the Association Agreement with the European Union, 
signifying a willingness of both sides to proceed toward formal membership.78 Realizing 
the need to conform the Western standards of human and minority rights, Iliescu adhered 
to the United Nations-sponsored Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in 1994 and the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
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Protection of National Minorities in 1995.79 Iliescu also sought the protection of a 
security organization, but prepared to work closely with a reformed Russia. Any 
association with Russia had little support, as the suspicion of Russia as an enemy of 
Romania was increasingly popular having arisen during the first half of the nineteenth 
century and reinforced by the Communist experience.80 Seeking to maintain his office 
and the country’s present direction, Iliescu sought out the support of NATO.  
1. NATO Membership 
As Gheciu articulates, “accession to NATO, however, was regarded by the 
Central and Eastern European reformers as part of a broader process of returning to 
Europe and taking their place in the Euro-Atlantic community.”81 Romania was left out 
of the first wave of enlargement in 1997, but was told that by continuing the reform 
process, Romania would have a good chance at securing NATO membership in the 
future.82 At the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO expanded the Planning and Review 
Process aimed at enhancing the Membership Action Plan. MAP laid out the systematic 
process of which Romania could follow to secure membership.83 NATO provided a 
systematic process of socialization aimed at instilling Western norms into Romania’s 
civil-military relations. A senior allied officer who participated in consultations with 
Romanians and the NATO framework accession process, explained to Romanians, 
“commitment to principles of liberal democracies helped us to leave behind problems we 
had had for centuries; we are living proof that if you do the right things, and if you work 
hard enough, you will win.”84 It is easy to imagine the impact this would have on the 
Romanian mindset considering their cruel history and past century of bloodshed. 
Romania firmly anchored itself in the Euro-Atlantic community, conforming to 
expectations and eagerly attending courses at the Marshall Center, NATO Defense 
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College, and other Partnership for Peace-related educational institutions.85 In 1999, 
Romanians would be put to the test in their first mission under PfP and performed well 
complying with Western-defined standards.86 After September 11, 2001, the strategic 
value in Romania grew and the United States was quick to seek their cooperation. 
Romania sent civilian experts and troops into Afghanistan and Iraq in spite of significant 
economic costs, costs that a rebuilding Romania could ill afford.87 As the major 
European countries criticized the U.S. for its War on Terror, Romania and other former-
bloc countries stepped up earning the resentment of France and other West European 
states.88 Nonetheless, Romania’s efforts were rewarded at the Prague Summit in 2002 
with membership to NATO. While security efforts paid off, economic rebuilding was 
proving to be slow. Romania having begun the process of EU membership in 1993 finally 
was allowed accession in 2007.89 With accession into NATO and the EU, Romania thus 
completed the Communist transition period and firmly stood as a European country. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Romania’s long history is crucial to understanding not only its strategic value in 
the security of Europe but also its desire to contribute alongside the United States and 
within NATO. As stated by Bucharest University political scientist Radu Dudau, “all 
serious foreign policy discussion in Romania begins and ends with geography.”90 
Forever caught in the middle between a powerful and culturally advancing Europe and a 
traditional and vast empire of Russia, Romania has always had to choose sides to survive. 
Through two bloody world wars and an oppressive Cold War as a member of the Warsaw 
Pact, Romania has emerged as a lynchpin to the Black Sea security. Crawling out of the 
Cold War years, Romania quickly sought improved relations from the West, especially 
the United States. Romanian professor Valentin Naumescu contended, “Romania…was 
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arguably the most pro-American and anti-Russian country in the Balkans and 
southeastern Europe.”91 Romanian efforts at democratization and modernization were 
rewarded with admittance to NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007.92 
Considering the border nations of the Black Sea; Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Russia, 
Georgia, and Ukraine; the latter two which have waged war with Russia in the past 
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III. THE UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTEREST IN 
ROMANIA AND THE BLACK SEA  
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Ukrainian crisis and its 2014 Crimean annexation have renewed interest in 
the U.S. military’s strategic value in security of the Black Sea region.93 Facing a 
resurgent Russia combined with the unknown and often-contradictory nature of the 
current Trump administration, the United States military has been reinforcing ties with 
NATO and its allied countries.94 Perhaps of these Eastern European countries, none is 
more important than the country of Romania. A wide array of operations is currently 
underway in Romania and around the Black Sea, demonstrating the importance of joint 
exercises and international cooperation through NATO. Military personnel stationed or 
serving in Romania must understand the historical context and cultural perspective from 
which Romania’s desire to contribute to security originates. In an age of an ever-evolving 
range of military operations and responsibilities asked of the U.S. military, the citizen-
soldier must be aware of the past and ready to meet the challenges of the future. 
B. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
Among the efforts to increase presence, perhaps none is more prominent than the 
U.S. commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe. Emphasized in the 2017 
EUCOM Posture Statement, “EUCOM continues to implement the EPAA (European 
Phased Adaptive Approach) to defend European NATO populations, territory, and 
infrastructure against ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region.”95 
The BMD defense architecture consists of satellites for early warning, Aegis Ashore for 
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sensor and shooter in Deveselu, Romania and in 2018, Poland, BMD tracking radar in 
Turkey in addition to the four Aegis BMD-capable ships out of Spain.96 When Aegis 
Ashore was declared operational on May 12, 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg said the activation of the site “represents a significant increase in the 
capability to defend European Allies against the proliferation of ballistic missiles.”97 
Almost as old as the Alliance itself, missile defense forms the backbone of collective 
security to counter weapons of mass destruction in Europe 
1. European Phased Adaptive Approach  
The EPAA was thought to be a turning point or even possible sign of the U.S. 
reneging on previous commitment to European partners. As much turmoil as the decision 
caused it is worth noting the chain of events and reasoning behind the actions to ensure 
there are no misconceptions. 
2. Ballistic Missile Defense under President Bush 
As the United States fought wars alongside newly admitted NATO members in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran quickly emerged as a threat to U.S. and NATO security. Iran, 
using a Russian-built Bushehr nuclear reactor began to develop its nuclear operations 
raising fears of an Iranian development program for intercontinental-range ballistic 
missiles.98 President Bush made United States antimissile defense system on European 
soil a top priority soon after taking office and increased the growing US-Russia chasm by 
withdrawing from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty with Russia.99 In 2006, President Bush 
proposed the establishment of antimissile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in an 
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effort to stop would be attacks stemming from Iran against the United States and its 
European allies.100  
Not surprisingly, Russia was angered by the perceived threat so close to their 
homeland, and in many ways the proposed missile sites reopened Cold War wounds on 
both sides.101 Russia, perhaps justifiably, felt threatened by the NATO enlargement and 
was not shy to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. Russian Houses of 
Parliament adopted resolutions specifically and formerly to denounce NATO 
expansion.102 Vladimir Putin increased his rhetoric vowing to reciprocate, and “build our 
defense and security policy accordingly.”103 Despite assurances from the U.S. and NATO 
that the missile defense sites are set up to combat a threat from Iran, Russian defense 
minister Sergei Ivanov reiterated Russia’s viewpoint claiming the proposed sites in 
Poland and the Czech Republic will have a “negative impact on the whole Euro-Atlantic 
security system” adding “the choice for location for the deployment of those systems is 
dubious, to put it mildly.”104  
As the United States continued with plans for the missile sites, Russia suspended 
its obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, a key Cold War-era arms 
limitation agreement.105 At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO backed the U.S. plans 
for missile defense in Europe while at the same time rejecting the vote to admit Georgia 
and Ukraine into the alliance.106 Soon after, Russia invaded Georgia, asserting Russia 
will in a former Soviet sphere of influence and seemingly sending a message to the west.  
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3. The Russian Reset 
Soon after President Obama took office in 2004, he supposedly scrapped the 
missile defense plan in favor or a new missile defense option on September 17, 2009.107 
Critics berated the new president for caving to Russia’s rhetoric in order to accomplish 
the goal of a Russian “reset.”108 In a time of transition, the Obama administration was 
criticized for turning their backs on the U.S.’s oldest allies in order to appease Russia. 
Taking office under the pretext of hope and change, President Obama sought to 
reestablish diplomatic relations with alleged enemies and cooperate with partners rather 
than seeking unilateral action. The Obama administration placed high priority on 
restoring Russian relations with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton famously wielding a 
reset button. Nonetheless, President Obama needed Russian support to enforce United 
Nations sanctions on Iran for violations pertaining to their nuclear program. After 
campaigning on a promise to support the European missile defense program, on 
September 17, 2009, President Obama abandoned the Bush plan for missile defense.  
4. Ballistic Missile Defense under President Obama 
President Obama shocked the world in the seemingly stark change of U.S. foreign 
policy. Domestically, critics of the newly elected Democratic Obama were appalled by 
his actions. Defeated Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney took the 
opportunity to point to Obama’s naivety on Russian president, Vladimir Putin, calling the 
Obama’s pull out “a gift to Russia.”109 Republicans including Senator John McCain, 
released statements calling Obama soft and implying he let down American allies. John 
Bolton, a Bush-appointed ambassador to the United Nations said Russia and Iran came 
away as “big winners” in a “bad day for American national security.”110 Current Vice 
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President-Elect, then Rep. of Indiana, Mike Pence lambasted Obama stating, “Only a year 
since Russia invaded Georgia, and 70 years to the day since the Soviet Union invaded 
Poland, the Obama administration is continuing its policy of appeasing adversaries at the 
expense of our allies.”111  
The disastrous timing of the announcement was not lost on the Poles. Eugeniusz 
Smolar, a former chief of Warsaw’s Centre for International Relations, said simply, “We 
are disappointed.”112 Others took a harsher tone like Alexander Vondra, a former Czech 
deputy Prime Minister and ambassador to Washington who was heavily involved in the 
negotiations on the missile defense sites, said in surprise, “This is a U-turn in U.S. policy; 
first we expect the U.S. to honour its commitments, if they don’t they may have problems 
generating support for Afghanistan and on other things.”113 Foreign Policy contributors 
Douglas Feith and Seth Cropsey summarized the feelings of many involved stating, “the 
president embarrassed their pro-American leaders, hurt the NATO alliance, showed 
weakness toward Russia, deemphasized the importance of missile defense, and called 
America’s word into question.”114 President Obama even sent a letter to Russian 
President Medvedev, stating he would reevaluate the missile defense program.115 
President Obama appeared to have caved to Russia’s aggression in order to receive its 
support against Iran.  
Critics of the Obama administration’s EPAA argued that Obama turned his back 
on America’s partners in Europe, specifically Poland and the Czech Republic, and 
furthermore that Obama was using the new proposal to appease Russia. Contrary to the 
reports that implied the Czech Republic and Polish governments and leaders were eagerly 
awaiting their new missile defense partnership with the US, internal political differences 
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kept both the Poles and Czechs from ratifying their respective agreements. In Poland, 
following snap elections held on October 21, 2007, Poles replaced the current party with 
a right two party coalition led by Donald Tusk. Tusk indicated that “his government 
would not be as compliant toward the United States…and that it would seek to bargain 
more actively on missile defense.”116 While talks continued, Tusk wanted more assets 
and refused to sign the accord.  
The missile defense issue was even more complicated in the Czech Republic. On 
March 24, 2009, the ruling coalition failed a no-confidence vote resulting in Prime 
Minister Mirek Topolanek offering his government’s resignation.117 An interim 
government was reluctant to make any agreements until a new government could be 
elected. Polls showed a strong opposition (60%-70%) to the missile defense plan. 
Considering their history of Nazi occupation and Soviet governance, the public was 
resistant to the stationing of any foreign troops on their soil.118  
To read to the headlines and listen to opponents of the Obama administration, one 
would think President Obama took office and immediately crumpled up plans for 
European missile defense and threw them in the wastebasket of the Oval Office. Looking 
back, it is evident that he merely steered the program into a direction that it was slowly 
heading through its development. Missile defense has been a priority for American 
presidents since the invention of the missiles in the 1950s, increasing substantially with 
threats from Russia. The U.S. has spent over $120 Billion in the first 50 years of missile 
defense programs. In just the time period from 2002 to 2008, President Bush’s Missile 
Defense Agency spent over $57 Billion.119 After the initial proposal, the Department of 
Defense Missile Defense Agency conducted simulations as to the effectiveness of the 
long-range missile defense system. Tests conducted showed substantial issues with the 
capabilities and effectiveness of the missile defense program.  
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Observers noted that a medium to short-range interceptor might be more 
appropriate to be based in Europe.120 In addition to issues of the appropriate range, the 
timeline of Iranian missile development was misjudged. Gary Samore, vice president of 
the MacArthur Foundation and former aide at the National Security Council asserted, “As 
far as I can tell, Iran is many years away from having the capability to deliver a military 
strike against the U.S.” In line with this thinking, the Bush proposal would not bring 
systems online until “at least 2017, and likely much later” claimed Gates.121 Then 
Defense Officials realized the Iranian Government was in favor developing short to 
medium range missiles and may do so at a much faster pace than previously thought.  
In a New York Times Op-Ed, and later in his memoirs, Robert Gates, a Secretary 
of Defense under Bush and Obama told the history and evolution of the missile defense 
plan. Days after taking over as SECDEF in December 2006, Gates recommended to Bush 
the proposal for the missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. According 
to Gates, 
this system was designed to identify and destroy up to five long-range 
missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle 
East—the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it 
was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment 
available.122 
Considering the new information available from Iranian experts in the Defense 
Department, coupled with failed American tests of the new technology and equipment 
proposed to intercept Iranian missiles, new plans were to be considered. The House 
Armed Services Committee cited this concern in the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill 
and further directed two studies: (1) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 
were required to submit a report to Congress on alternative missile defense capabilities 
such as Aegis could contribute to the missile defense protection and Europe and (2) that 
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an independent assessment of European missile defense options should be done in a 
timely manner.123  
The very next year the Senate Armed Services Committee approved its version of 
the FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill. The committee provided full funding with 
specific stipulations to be met before funds were to be expended: (1) Polish and Czech 
governments ratified the agreements to set up missile defense sites, (2) SECDEF proved 
to Congress that the proposed interceptor program demonstrated high probability of 
accomplishing its mission.124  
In June of 2009, the House Armed Services Committee reserved funds for the 
missile defense project for one of two purposes: (1) either SECDEF continue with the 
current program until operationally effective or (2) the SECDEF pursue an alternative 
program with the stipulation that 
this option is conditional on certification from the Secretary of Defense 
that the alternative is consistent with NATO efforts to address ballistic 
missile defense threats, that any alternative addresses ballistic missile 
threats to Europe in a prioritized manner that includes the level if 
imminence of the threat and level of risk, and that any alternative be cost-
effective, technically reliable and operationally available in protecting 
Europe and the United States.125 
Resulting from ongoing investigations during the Bush Presidency considering 
the excessive costs and unproven capabilities, Secretary Gates proposed a new plan to 
President Obama.  
5. A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe 
In 2009, in the Obama Presidency, it was again Gates who proposed to the 
president a new plan, urging him to change course. “I sincerely believed the new program 
was better, more in accord with the political realties in Europe and more effective against 
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the emerging Iranian threat.”126 In this light, Gates claimed, “we are strengthening, not 
scrapping, missile defense in Europe.”127 Gates proposed a plan to utilize the proven and 
well-established Aegis weapons system as a cornerstone of what would be called a 
European Phased Adaptive Approach starting with stationing U.S. Aegis ships in Rota, 
Spain, setting up an Aegis Ashore missile defense site in Romania and later in Poland, 
and also putting an X-Band Radar in Turkey. Poland was overjoyed to accept the U.S. 
offer on the missile shield. Mariusz Handzlik, the chief foreign policy advisor to the 
Polish president, exclaimed, “The elements of the new missile defense system will be 
based in Poland; this is very important for Poland, for NATO and the U.S., above all, this 
is about the long term strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Poland.”128 While the 
policy change required a recalibration of expectations and efforts, it has in no way left 
Europe without security and a strong American partnership.  
President Obama agreed with Bush that Iran’s ballistic missile program posed a 
significant threat, yet adapted the proposal for technology “that best responds to the 
threats that we face and that utilize technology that is both proven and cost-effective.”129 
Because the approach is phased and adaptive, Obama argued that it offered the flexibility 
to deal with new threats and adjust as “the threat and technology continue to evolve.”130 
It was thus; with a new plan using tried and true, technology was able to stand up 
facilities years before the previous proposal had planned with Romanian Aegis ashore 
coming online in December of 2015.  
6. A Different Leader among Domestic Constraints 
President Obama took office amid world turmoil. Relieved of his office in 
January 2017, he became the first American president to serve both terms of his 
                                                 
126 Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 
2014), 107. 
127 Gates, “Missile Defense.”  
128 Judy Dempsey, “Poland to Accept U.S. Offer on Shield,” The New York Times, October 21 2009. 
129 President Barrack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe 




presidency at war. When he took office though, his goal was to regain an acceptable 
order of peace. President Obama’s administration sought to “reduce the defense budget, 
refresh U.S. foreign policy, and concentrate his time and energy on his domestic 
agenda.”131 Ballistic Missile Defense was not a policy priority for the Obama Presidency, 
in fact, “the administration’s approach to the issue would be ‘pragmatic,’ and depend 
upon balancing other priorities.”132 Pursuing a more humble approach to missile 
programs and defense, the administration sought to reengage Russia and agree to a New 
START treaty to reduce arms, something that had expired under the Bush administration.  
President Obama viewed the world much more different from his predecessor, 
President Bush. Whereas Bush could be categorized as pessimistic and willing to go-it-
alone in battles waged on terrorism, Obama was optimistic and determined to use 
diplomatic efforts to ease tensions. “Obama had made it clear in 2008 in response to a 
series of missile tests by Iran that he saw ‘direct and aggressive diplomacy,’ not missile 
defense, as the primary means to deal with rogue states.”133 In his speech in Prague on 
nuclear disarmament, Obama made it clear that he was changing course to back down 
from altercations and not seek them out. Exemplifying the stark difference in leadership 
President Obama was recognized as the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009.  
President Obama, with his goals of diplomacy and peace though, could not afford 
to look weak on defense, as Republicans would point out, or to disappoint European 
allies. At the same time, he could not disappoint his own party as “democrats in congress 
remained firmly against expanded BMD deployment.”134 Admitting during his speech 
announcing the change to the missile defense program that missiles are a threat to 
Europe, President Obama did not abandon the program, stating, “We have restructured 
our test program to improve confidence in the missile defense capabilities under 
development and ensure that the capabilities transferred to the war-fighter are 
                                                 
131 Andrew Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and U.S. National Security Policy: Normalisation and 
Acceptance after the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2013), 134. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 138. 
134 Ibid., 58. 
 
 37 
operationally effective, suitable and survivable.”135 Moreover, rather than bilateral 
agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic, the new proposal would encompass all 
of NATO, strengthen the coalition and American ties in Europe, including a budding 
relationship with an eager Romania.  
The theory seems strongest in the arguments that the proposed missile defense 
system was simply better, more cost effective, proven technologically, and a faster 
solution to the Iranian missile threat. It seems President Obama, while not campaigning 
on missile defense, found the best compromise. He pleased democrats by utilizing a more 
cost-effective solution, and calmed Republican fears by merely updating and improving, 
not scrapping the missile defense sites. Moreover, European allies that claimed to be 
insulted clearly had their own domestic politics to deal with, but Poland overcame, and 
Romania was more than willing to take on the American base.  
C. MILITARY OPERATIONS 2014–2017 
Despite the Pivot to the Pacific and ongoing unrest in the Middle East, attention is 
being refocused to Europe, home to America’s oldest allies and most influential alliance, 
NATO.136 General Curtis M. Scaparrotti is dual-hatted as the Commander of the United 
States European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; a 
distinction and responsibility not found in any other geographic combatant command. 
General Scaparrotti reaffirmed the role of the United States and NATO, stating “the 
resurgence of Russia, with its aggressive global power interests, European Command has 
had to adapt to a new reality of instability and uncertainty, forcing us to examine our 
partnerships and relationships with the 51 countries within the command’s area of 
responsibility.”137 As a leader of not only the U.S. in Europe but of all European allies, 
General Scaparrotti has significant responsibility to uphold unity of command. This is 
difficult to accomplish in joint U.S. military operations, and even more challenging and 
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crucial to obtain in a multinational setting. To achieve a common objective “where the 
commander may not control all elements, he seeks cooperation and builds consensus to 
achieve unity of effort.”138 
1. European Reassurance Initiative 
EUCOM’s engagement under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative 
“contributed greatly to the development of better-trained peacekeeping forces among 
Eastern European countries.”139 After attention shifted in 2001 to CENTCOM, 
AFRICOM and PACOM, and with Russia taking advantage of the decreased western 
presence, the U.S. needed to reemphasize the commitment to Europe. To reassure NATO 
Allies and partners President Obama proposed the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) 
June 3, 2014.140 With a budget of $3.42 billion for 2017, ERI clearly demonstrates the 
strong commitment to territorial integrity of U.S. Allies and to maintaining a strong and 
peaceful Europe.141 To ensure the success of European peacekeeping operations, 
EUCOM implemented five elements of the ERI: increased rotational presence of forces, 
increased bilateral and multilateral exercises, improved infrastructure, enhanced 
prepositioning, and intensified efforts to build partner capacity.142 In 2017 alone, the 
budget allows for 28 joint and multi-national exercises, training more than 18,000 U.S. 
personnel alongside 45,000 NATO Allies and PfP personnel. One of many operations in 
Romania, the deployment of the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade brings U.S. Army Black 
Hawk helicopters to support and train Romanian forces.143 ERI funds enable further 
operations under the umbrella of European security. 
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2. Operation Atlantic Resolve 
One of the major operations funded by ERI is Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) 
with the purpose of “strengthening capabilities and sustaining readiness through bilateral 
and multinational training and exercises.”144 While remaining under U.S. Command, 
these forces integrate tightly with U.S. partners and signal an ongoing commitment to 
security by way of prepositioned personnel and equipment. In Romania, the Mihail 
Kogalniceanu Air Base hosts a mission command capability to ensure a persistent and 
continuous presence in the Black Sea region. Additionally, Romanian and U.S. armored 
crewmembers took part in live fire training exercises at the Smardan Training Area. The 
exercise, “involving armored infantry and artillery elements… [demonstrated] the 
mobility of both armies as they worked together to fire on multiple targets.”145 U.S. 
Major General John Gronski, deputy-commanding general for the Army National Guard 
in attendance, observed that “outstanding soldiers conducting tough and realistic training 
and working together.”146 Under OAR, infrastructure allows for increased exercises. 
Exercise Resolute Castle, the Romanian-focused arm of OAR, strengthens engineering 
units working side-by-side breaking ground on a new foundation that will enhance the 
Joint National Training Center in Cincu, Romania.147 OAR is a significant step forward 
allowing for increased presence through coordination on a multinational stage.  
3. Readiness Action Plan 
In September 2014, at the Wales Summit, NATO took another step forward by 
upgrading its NATO Response Force (NRF) recognizing the threat of hybrid warfare. 
Under the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), NATO is upgrading it capabilities to address 
weaknesses and threats at the Southern and Eastern flanks.148 Using a Very High 
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Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) structure, NATO will have on hand “dynamic forces 
comprised of five maneuver battalions (around 5,000 troops) supported by maritime, air, 
and special forces elements.”149 At the core of this concept are NATO Force Integration 
Units (NFIUs), which will play a crucial role in combating hybrid warfare.150 Eight units 
are designed to “enable a rapid-reaction force deployment and a fast military buildup on 
the Eastern Flank” to deter or defeat Russian aggression.151 Headquarters for the NFIUs 
are split between Poland for the North with Multinational Division Southeast located in 
Bucharest, Romania. With the RAP so popular among allies, it was agreed upon at the 
2016 Warsaw Summit to further strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture 
with Enhanced Forward Presence (EfP).152 
4. Enhanced Forward Presence 
A major facet of the EfP is naval presence on the Black Sea. While limited by the 
Montreux Convention terms of 21 days for non-Black Sea powers, the U.S. frequently 
conducts freedom of navigation operations and joint exercises maintaining a presence for 
Allies and deterrence for Russia. The ships’ operations are meant to “enhance maritime 
security, stability, readiness, and strengthen partnerships.”153 Ships are frequently met by 
Russian jets and have recently made headlines for close encounters at sea under 
dangerous conditions.154 U.S. vessels operating in the Black Sea include the 6th Fleet 
command ship, USS Mount Whitney, one of only two seaborne joint command vessels, 
further emphasizing the importance of the mission and area.155 The four U.S. Navy 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable destroyers stationed in Rota, Spain make 
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frequent patrols of the Black Sea.156 Under exercises such as Sea Breeze 2016, an annual 
exercise for the past 15 years held in the Black Sea, the destroyers “conduct the full 
spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied, joint, and interagency 
partners, in order to advance U.S. national interest and security and stability in 
Europe.”157 To offset the limitation by the Montreux Convention, at the 2016 NATO 
Warsaw Summit, Romania proposed for a permanent Black Sea Fleet under the Black 
Sea Initiative. The proposal called for a multinational flotilla and increased naval patrols 
and joint exercises in the Black Sea.158 While the proposal was tabled for now, it only 
proves the willingness of U.S. allies to increase presence and cooperation in response to 
Russian aggression.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Europe will continue to be an important ally for the U.S. and the U.S. must 
continue to strengthen and reinforce the relationship. Much has transpired in regard to the 
increase in attention afforded to Europe. Romania has emerged as a wholehearted partner 
for the U.S. and a thriving ally within NATO. General Scaparrotti’s increased focus on 
building relationships appears likely to continue as long as Russia remains the 
antagonists. During the current Trump administration, the relationship with Russia has 
become murky to say the least. The same Republicans berating President Obama over 
turning his back on European Allies are silent as President Trump sows doubt in the 
future of the Euro-Atlantic alliance.  
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IV. RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS IN THE BLACK SEA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Western and Russian relationship stands at a crossroads. Down one path is 
the status quo of uneasy peace; down the other path is a return to armed animosity. The 
United States and Russia relationship is in troubled with geopolitical disharmony as 
tenuous as it has been since the days of McCarthyism, with suspicions held and 
accusations hurled by all parties involved.159 The European project is cracking, showing 
signs of its fragility with Brexit in 2016 and the parties of the radical right gaining 
traction that has not been tangible since World War II. Russia, led by the Vladimir Putin, 
is resurgent in its aggressiveness and military might. Not since the Cold War has Russia 
concentrated on building up its military and arsenals at the current pace.160 In the middle 
is the Black Sea, what appears to be, quite literally, the front lines of a renewed conflict 
between the West and Russia. Recent increases in American military presence and 
NATO exercises have led to narrow escapes on the Black Sea and in the air above.161 In 
the United States, one is usually only given the American side of the story.162 With 
headlines of Russian connections in the government coming out seemingly each new day, 
it is more important than ever to understand the adversary and background in order to 
examine the situation in the proper context. Why is presence in the Black Sea so vital to 
Russian national interest, so much as to annex Crimea in the first border-change by force 
since World War II?163 To answer the aforementioned question, one must understand the 
                                                 
159 “Moscow Says Plans to Create NATO’s Black Sea Flotilla Undermine Regional Security,” TASS, 
April 27, 2016, http://tass.com/politics/872870. 
160 Alex Williamson, “From Cold War to Hot War,” The Economist, February 12, 2015, accessed 
November 14, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-
broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation. 
161 “Russian Planes, U.S. Warship Have Close Encounter Near Crimea,” CNN Politics, last modified 
June 1, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/russia-plane-navy-uss-ross/. 
162 “Is Western Media Coverage of the Ukraine Coverage Anti-Russian?” The Guardian, last modified 
August 4, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/04/western-media-coverage-ukraine-crisis-
russia. 




history and motivations of Russia do concern the Black Sea. Only then, can one remain 
unbiased and look at the issue through a calmer lens without accelerating down the wrong 
path.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin said, “We are against… 
NATO’s ruling to roost near our fence, next to our houses or on our historical 
territories.”164 As political scientist Robert Nalbandov ascertained, “This sentence, and 
the whole speech, is the epitome of fear-based rationales in Russian foreign policy 
behavior.”165 But what determines these deeply imprinted notions of what constitutes 
Russian territory or their self-proclaimed sphere of influence? Author Robert Gildea 
refers to this belief as “an ideology of blood and soil.”166 This irredentist ideology is key 
to Putin’s strategic vision governing foreign relations and forms a frequently utilized 
rationalization of Russian aggressiveness. This policy is more than cheap propaganda and 
should not be quickly dismissed as an archaic justification. It plays so well to the Russian 
people because it truly is a part of the shared history of Eastern Europeans. A nation 
cannot be easily defined by its present borders drawn by the victors of the last war. 
Nationhood is made up of various cultural factors: common ancestry and descent, 
religion, a shared language, as well as geographical and military considerations.167  
1. Common Ancestry 
The need to create a Russian nationhood relies on the ability to pull away people 
in Eurasia from the West and into Russian influence through a common ancestry and 
descent. Historian Evgeny Kozhokin advocated for “the historically legitimate national 
identity that recognized ‘the Eurasian essence of Russia as a definitive civilizational 
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phenomenon.’”168 Much of the Russian identity draws from the relationship and 
differences with the West. As Russian political scientist Igor Zevelev argues, “the roots 
of the current discussion on Russian identity can be traced back to the nineteenth-century 
debates between Slavophiles and Westernizers.”169 Emphasizing a unique character of 
Russian civilization, Slavophiles developed a universal character of Russian identity 
made up of all Slavic peoples.170 Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, touted Russian 
“openness, inclusiveness, and messianism” and Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, wanted 
to “understand and include the entire European culture into the Russian soul.”171  
The commonality of culture was not just ideas but was formulated by the doctrine 
of official nationalism.172 An empire of multinational people was cultivated with loyalty 
to the monarch, state, and church; not encouraged but demanded.173 Gathering territories 
under the Russian umbrella allowed the Russian national identity to be about creating a 
balance to the imperial western European ambitions. Russia viewed their special role in 
European and global history, not as separate identities but as an intertwined people with 
shared historical legacies different from those of the West.174 
2. Religious Ties 
Much of the sense of unity among Russian people concerns the orthodox religion. 
When Putin referenced the Ukrainian affair, he spoke of religion, “It was thanks to this 
spiritual unity [in Crimea] that our forefathers for the first time and forevermore saw 
themselves as a united nation.”175 Putin went so far as to compare Crimea’s “sacred 
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importance for Russia” to the likes of Temple Mount for followers of Islam and 
Judaism.176 It was in Crimea that Grand Prince Vladimir was baptized, signaling the turn 
to Russian Christianity.177 Of course, religions changed over time, and followers were 
forcefully converted, ousted, or even killed. In 1833, Tsarist Russia implemented an 
official ideology of “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality” using them as “principles 
of exclusion that justified persecuting Ukrainians.”178  
Conversely, the Orthodox Church has undergone turbulent times. During the 
Soviet period, all religion was banned as “opium for the masses” with the Communist 
regime executing as much as 95 percent of the clergy.179 Putin now uses religion as an 
instrument in depicting Russia as superior in its virtues as compared to the morally 
bankrupt West.180 Furthermore, this justification gives Russian’s annexation of Crimea a 
convincing sense of legitimacy. As historian Robert Nalbandov, articulates, Russia has 
“institutionalized the unilateral Russian vision of its own place in the world justified by 
divine revelation.”181 
3. Linguistic Links 
Religious unity was closely interconnected to a common language, necessary in 
religious texts and teachings. Language is one of the clearest examples of unity in a 
population. Speaking the same tongue breaks down communication barriers and gives 
society a common identity. The fabric of society is built upon the ability to talk to one 
another not just in speech but also in literature, the arts, religious practices, and passed 
down fables of ancestry; it influences every aspect of society. As Zevelev states, 
“Russian language and literature are viewed in the Kremlin as the tools to preserve 
national identity, ‘what makes us unique, our own character and traditions…the historic 
continuity and the links between different generations…for Russians this is a question of 
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being and remaining Russian.’”182 Gildea called language “the defining ingredient” in 
national identity.183  
Yet, like religion, language is not an innocuous tapestry made over time; it is a 
forcefully woven aspect of society imposed upon by the dominant nationality of the 
period. The development of modern language and literature was not an easy transition. 
Since the Byzantine period, the Russian written language was Church Slavonic. Then in 
1783, the Russian Academy based its new literary language on the vernacular instead, in 
attempts to compete with the French.184 Grammar was introduced in 1789 and 1794, and 
eventually a dictionary in 1802.185 Russia imposed their language on their territories in a 
process called “Russification,” using elementary schools in Poland to teach the Russian 
tongue.186 While this was common Russian policy, it was more severe in Ukraine than 
anywhere else, with Russians “banning the use of Ukrainian language and dialects in the 
western provinces.”187 Russian nationalists made common practice of denying Ukrainian 
language and culture altogether. Since Ukraine is considered “a core and the birthplace of 
Russian identity,” the ethnic uniqueness of Ukrainians must be denied for fear of 
devaluing the Russian identity.188 While Russia deliberately cultivates the spread of 
Russian language, it simultaneously uses the shared language as a link for all Russian 
people. Putin expertly exploits the common use of language; according to journalist and 
Putin critic Masha Gessen, “Putin showed that he ‘intends to save the world from the 
West; he has started with Crimea; when he says he is protecting ethnic Russians in 
Ukraine, he means he is protecting them from the many terrible things that come from the 
West.’”189 
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4. Land and Resources 
Alongside the argument of a common people or blood, Russia maintains that there 
is a common soil. The appreciation of a homeland, with its natural beauties and 
resources, is engrained in the Russian identity.190 Ukraine and Crimea occupy a 
significant distinction on the hierarchy of Russian frontiers as the birthplace of the Slavic 
identity and cradle of the future Russian empire.191 Additionally, Crimea allowed the 
Russian empire lucrative access to the Mediterranean through the Black Sea in order to 
build up their marine based foreign trade.192 As political scientist Halford Mackinder, 
presented in his “Heartland” theory, Russia has been engaged in energy politics 
supplying fossil fuel products in a bid for economic and political influence.193 Russia is 
one of the world’s largest energy producers with 87.2 billion barrels of oil reserves.194 
The EU attempted to establish an entity with Black Sea surrounding states to better 
manage the economic relationship and trade deals with Black Sea Synergy (BSS). 
Russia’s “lack of interest and involvement” has hindered BSS development and 
effectiveness.195 Furthermore, Russia insisted that the BSS operate on an equal basis with 
the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), an organization 
already in existence before EU expansion.196 Russia owns the bulk of the supply but also 
aims to control the distribution and trade networks. As Mackinder stated, “who controls 
the export routes controls the oil and gas; who control the oil and gas controls the 
Heartland,” with the Heartland being Europe.197 Aside from merely trade routes and 
ports, Russia is expected to claim not only Crimea’s, but also Ukraine’s continental shelf 
and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), expanding their claims to the territory and trade 
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conducted within it.198 Crimea and the Black Sea have come to hold a type of romantic 
fixture in Russian identity, but more tangible than that, they hold a place of significant 
economic importance and security. 
C. THE BLACK SEA FLEET 
The western shores of the Russian empire were vital to ensure Russian Naval 
access to the Mediterranean. Russian’s territorial expansion was fundamental to their 
ability to operate out of a warm water port that would remain open year round. If Russia 
aims to compete with the West, historically, and especially present day with the wars in 
Afghanistan and Syria, presence on the Mediterranean is crucial. As far back to the 16th 
century, Russia waged campaigns with the Ottoman Empire for access to the Black 
Sea.199 Russia gained control of the Black Sea Coast, including Crimea, in 1739, with the 
Treaty of Belgrade.200 However, the London Straits Convention of 1841 closed the straits 
to warships in times of peace, limiting Russia’s capacity of power projection.201 The 
battle to regain Russia’s control over the Black Sea culminated in defeat in the Crimean 
War of 1853–56, resulting in the 1856 Treaty at Paris removing Russia’s right to hold a 
fleet in the Black Sea.202  
World War I saw additional battles between the Ottomans and Russians. A major 
buildup in the interwar period made for various confrontations in World War II in the 
Siege of Odessa and the Battle of Sevastopol.203 During the Soviet period, the Black Sea 
transformed into a battleground for influence between the Soviets and the West with the 
accession of Turkey into NATO in 1952.204 With the advent of nuclear weapons and the 
missile build up with the United States, Russia would begin a period of neglect with the 
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Black Sea Fleet. No longer was this regional area strategically important in the age of the 
space race and nuclear deterrence. With the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Sevastopol would fall under the control of the former Soviet state, Ukraine.205 
In 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed the Partition Treaty in order to minimize 
disputes over the joint operation of ports.206 Under the 1997 bilateral treaty, Russia also 
agreed to lease Sevastopol from Ukraine for $98 million annually for 20 years until 
2017.207 In 2010, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and Russian President Dimitri 
Medvedev agreed to extend the lease until 2042 and ratified the Kharkiv Pact.208 Russia 
unilaterally terminated the previous treaty on March 31, 2014, after the accession of 
Crimea into the Russia Federation earlier in the month.209 Since then, Russia has 
completely taken back the base at Sevastopol and has begun a revitalization of the region. 
D. PRESENT AGGRESSION: 2014–2017 
Since 2014, naval presence has increased exponentially, resulting in aggressive 
interactions on the Black Sea. Both Russia and the West have increased their rhetoric in 
words and action while competing for prominence in a strategically significant area, with 
NATO on the western shores and Russia on the eastern. NATO allies among the littoral 
states of the Black Sea include Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Russia and the two 
countries that Russia has engaged in wars with in the past decade; Ukraine and Georgia, 
who were denied NATO admittance at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, are the other littoral 
states on the Black Sea. Keeping the previous information in mind, it is understandable to 
see the Black Sea as a battleground of influence between Russia and NATO.  
While examining interactions and build-ups by NATO and Russia in the Black 
Sea, it is important to understand the governing multilateral treaty signed in 1936 at the 
                                                 
205 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 600.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Lo, Russian Disorder, Kindle location 109. 
208 Ibid. 
209 “State Duma Approves Denunciation of Russian-Ukrainian Agreements on Black Sea Fleet,” 
TASS: Russia News Agency, accessed February 20, 2017, http://tass.com/russia/725964. 
 
 51 
Montreux Convention.210 Limited in their deployment, “vessels of war belonging to non-
Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever 
be the object of their presence there.”211 This is not merely a paper tiger but has been 
enforced in the past. Turkey enforced the treaty against the West “to prevent the 
deployment of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour in the Black Sea; Turkey abided 
strictly by the terms of Montreux and even reportedly denied access to two large U.S. 
hospital ships.”212 Although limited to a stay of 21 days in the Black Sea, the United 
States has continued to send ships into the area as a show of force to deter Russian 
aggression and show support to NATO allies. The U.S. Secretary of the Navy stated, 
“We’re going to deter, that’s the main reason we’re there is to deter Russian 
aggression.”213  
While continuing United States presence on the Black Sea, U.S. Navy ships have 
been repeatedly subject to aggressive actions by Russia in what appears to be a show of 
force and disagreement over the purpose of the U.S. Navy’s deployments. The United 
States Navy released a video of Russian jets buzzing the USS Ross, in the Black Sea in 
2015.214 The video and accompanying article showed six Russian Su-24 jets flying 
within 500 meters of the American destroyer. Defense Secretary Ash Carter warned, “we 
are looking at Russian activities, at the activities of separatists; it’s a serious possibility 
and a serious danger,” maintaining that any actions of the West are in self-defense of 
progressively aggressive actions by Russia.215 Provocative actions have continued on the 
part of the Russians, and as recent as February 2017, Russian jets buzzed USS Porter, in 
what many said were attempts to test the new Trump administration.216  
                                                 
210 Nalbandov, Not by Bread Alone, Kindle location 8168. 
211 Ibid., Kindle location 8156. 
212 Ibid. 
213 “US to Russia: We’re Staying in the Black Sea,” Business Insider, last modified June 17, 2016, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-says-it-will-stay-in-black-sea-despite-russian-warning-2016-6. 
214 “Russian Planes, U.S. Warship Have Close Encounter near Crimea,” CNN Politics, last modified 
June 1, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/russia-plane-navy-uss-ross/. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Christine Hauser, “Trump, the Russia Ship and Suspicious Minds,” The New York Times, February 
16, 2016.  
 
 52 
The West maintains the line that NATO and U.S. need to show unity and support 
in order to defend against Russia. The U.S. upholds their presence stating, “operations 
aim to enhance maritime security and stability, readiness, and naval capability with our 
allies and partners.”217  
The U.S. is not alone in its defense against Russian aggression, receiving 
considerable support from other NATO nations. Romania, hosting the U.S. missile 
defense base in Deveselu, is a major proponent of increased naval exercises of NATO 
allies. Romania brought the proposal, Black Sea Initiative, to the 2016 NATO Warsaw 
Summit calling for a permanent Black Sea Fleet.218   The proposal called for a 
multinational flotilla, naval patrols and joint exercises in the Black Sea. Author Natalia 
Konarzewska of Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, praised the important steps 
taken but concluded they “will not entail a significant change in the existing imbalance of 
power vis-à-vis Russia in the Black Sea Region; NATO’s proposed collective activities in 
the region do not match Russia’s growing military posture.”219  With Russia increasing 
their presence around the Black Sea, it appears NATO is behind. A RAND Corporation 
study revealed, “although NATO has greater capabilities overall, it is easier for Russia to 
mass forces on its border and threaten a neighbor than for NATO to mass forces in 
response.”220 
 E. THE USE OF RUSSIAN MEDIA  
The belief that Russia must defend its sphere of influence is perpetrated 
consistently by Russian elites and the Russian media. Within two weeks of annexing 
Crimea, Russia announced plans to rebuild its naval base in Sevastopol, suggests a grand 
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scheme behind Russia’s motivations. Boasts of vast improvements are highlighted: six 
improved Kilo-class submarines, six Admiral Grigorovich class frigates, long-range 
cruise missiles, their newest surface-to-air missiles,and more.221 Yet, Russia contends it 
is merely responding to NATO aggression. Vladimir Putin posits an argument 
challenging: 
Publish the world map in your newspaper and mark all the U.S. military 
bases on it, you will see the difference [between Russian and Western 
aggression]. As for us, we are not expanding anywhere; it is NATO 
infrastructure, including military infrastructure that is moving towards our 
borders. Is this a manifestation of our aggression?222 
Russia’s Putin suggests that all of their actions are merely to counter an 
aggressive West. Russian media outlets echo the sentiment of their leader arguing, 
“NATO is trying to move confrontational schemes to the Black Sea and Russia will take 
measures to neutralize potential threats.”223 Moscow continues to deny claims of alleged 
interference in Ukraine and insists, “NATO’s military build-up on Russia’s borders is 
provocative and could harm regional and global stability.”224 Russian Foreign Ministry 
spokeswoman Maria Zakharova posted answers to questions posed by journalists 
repeating President Putin’s stance: 
Along with the deployment of missile defense system elements in 
Deveselu and other U.S. and NATO military infrastructure facilities in 
Romania and other countries, they indicate a desire to step up military 
activity in the region in close proximity to Russia’s borders. This seriously 
undermines security and stability in this part of the continent forcing 
Russia to take adequate countermeasures to ensure its own security.225 
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Whereas Western media portrays the Black Sea in a Cold War scenario, Russia 
maintains that this is only a Western invention. TASS reported statements of Russian 
diplomats, “I don’t want to say we have a ‘cold war’ in our relations with NATO, but the 
alliance seems to be opting for the cold war era security schemes, and it causes alarm as 
they imply not only politics but military build-up as well.”226 In fact, it is Russia that is 
diplomatically trying to calm the waters when Russia’s Permanent Representative to 
NATO Alexander Grushko, stated that “the quality of European security will depend not 
only on our ability to defuse the current tensions in relations between NATO and Russia 
in military terms but also on our ability to establish real collective cooperation in 
counteracting common security threats.”227 Still, Russians see NATO as an attempt to 
isolate Russia and that it exists because “NATO feels absolutely uncomfortable when it 
doesn’t have a big enemy.”228 Whereas NATO is building infrastructure around Russia, 
Russia is building its military capabilities on its own territory. Meanwhile, Grushko 
stressed about NATO, “I think it is a deliberate policy geared to justify NATO’s 
existence in the new security environment and concurrently solve other tasks- to make 
the Europeans shell out with defense spending and force them to buy U.S. made 
weapons.”229 
Russia maintains that its military buildup on the Black Sea is in self-defense of 
NATO and U.S. expansionary interests. Using the state-controlled media, Russian outlets 
continuously stoke the flames while simultaneously projecting Russian military might. 
Actions on the Black Sea and in the air above are backed up by forceful rhetoric. Russia 
vehemently asserts that any battles on the Black Sea would easily be won by Russia. 
Confidently Russians can say that “NATO ships will not be able to come close to Russian 
shores” and that if they do Russian submarines with their Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles 
                                                 







are “capable of raking the entire Black Sea with fire.”230 Former head of the coastal 
defense troops of the Soviet and Russian Black Sea Fleets, Major-General Vladimir 
Romanenko stated, “by my estimations, any NATO squadron, in combat conditions, 
would not survive any longer than 5–7 minutes.”231 Reiterating this train of thought, a 
Pravda Report disputed NATO’s power stating “Those ships that currently stay in the 
Black Sea would never be able to cause considerable damage to either the Black Sea 
Fleet or the territory of Russia, even if they wanted to.”232 Therefore, while maintaining 
that Russia is not the aggressor and only builds up its fleet in self-defense of NATO, 
Russia also does not shy from conflict and assures absolute victory. Whether this is to 
reassure the public as to Russia’s power or to ensure the west thinks twice before 
continuing their actions, remains to be seen. 
F. CONCLUSION 
It is nearly impossible to know the true nature of a state’s reasons for its actions, 
especially concerning aggressive actions as seen by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
While it may be hard to see issues through the lens of the other side, it remains 
imperative if for no other reason than to understand how to counter those issues. The fact 
is that Russia has had links to the Black Sea and shares a history with Ukraine and 
Crimea longer than the entire history of the United States. Justifying actions by stating 
that a portion of land is essentially Russian; as are the people, who occupy presents a 
formidable argument to some. Reasons of oil export, trade, and military base 
requirements are all reasons that even critics would agree that the United States used to 
seize foreign territory. While some arguments may have areas of validity, it is clear that 
the Putin leadership is all in and will continue to use these arguments to convince the 
Russian population and the rest of the world. Hearkening back to the glory days of the 
                                                 
230 “Why NATO’s Growing Presence in Black Sea Won’t Change the Strategic Balance,” Sputnik 
News, last modified June 1, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/military/201606011040598984-nato-black-sea-
russia-strategic-balance-analysis/. 
231 Ibid. 
232 “NATO Ships Would Live For Ten Minutes Max If They Attack Russia,” Pravda Report, last 




Russian Empire and playing to people’s familial ties and shared histories can be a 
powerful nostalgia especially when used to brush over harsh inconsistencies in those 
particular stances. It does not seem to play as well with those outside Russia, although 
comments from the Trump presidency seem to lean further than any president in recent 
history. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the motivations behind an adversary’s 
actions to take over territory and ignore the sovereignty of nations in its sphere of 
influence. Patrimonial activism on Russia’s part presents them with an important enigma 
as author Bobo Lo declares: “Moscow therefore faces a difficult choice: either it recasts 
its approach to factor in the changing dynamics in these countries…or it insists on its 
‘rights’ and risks damaging the very relationships and influence to which it attaches such 
importance.”233 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Alexis De Tocqueville wrote after his journey to America, “there are now two 
great nations in the world which, starting from different points seems to be advancing 
toward the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans.”234 Tocqueville was able 
to observe and foresee how two superpowers would come to be. The world today is more 
than two global hegemons but still the rhetoric and threat of nuclear war at the Cold War 
level exists. An irredentist Russia lead by Vladimir Putin seems wholeheartedly aimed at 
upending the status quo and reclaiming the prestige of a world leader. The United States 
is currently looking inward and drawing back from involvement in European affairs. For 
the first time in many decades, European leaders are willing to take a new direction 
having lost faith in the trans-Atlantic alliance.235 While the future is unclear, one can be 
sure that Europe remains a battlefield for ideology and identity. As has been their 
historical experience, Romanians again find themselves in the middle between a free 
democratic Europe and a resurgent authoritarian Russia. The United States has 
established a special relationship with Romania as the nations continue to support each 
other against threats, both internal and external.  
Perhaps one of the largest threats looming over NATO and cooperation among 
U.S. allies is the internal struggle over the importance of Europe and NATO inside the 
Trump administration. The very function of the U.S. as it pertains to peace in Europe is 
under evaluation. After a joint session with Stoltenberg, President Trump declared, “I 
said NATO was obsolete, it is no longer obsolete.”236 Yet with a policy of America First, 
allies may need more reassurance. Proposed cuts to the State Department in both budget 
and personnel would cause a complete reorganization of the department and major 
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hindrance to American influence abroad.237 Ambassadors and country teams already 
operate with insufficient assets, and may have to cut back further.238  
Here, the importance of the citizen-soldier will prove invaluable. Interagency 
coordination and multinational cooperation will be in the hands of the personnel in 
uniform serving overseas. For this reason, it is vital for those personnel deployed to 
understand the cultural environment they live in. UN diplomat Deborah Goodwin’s 
account of military cooperation in the Standard Generic Training Materials for the United 
Nations, cites, “peacekeepers should understand the cultural/historical context within 
which they work, including factors that influence the operation and the external pressures 
that inform the interest of other parties.”239 It is imperative that military personnel 
understand the nation where they are serving, whether it is Romania or elsewhere, even 
more so in a quickly changing environment where policy is uncertain.  
This thesis has explored the long history of Romanian conflict, specifically the 
Romanian struggle with national identity and to which direction to turn in order to 
guarantee security. The United States works alongside Romanian forces in a variety of 
capacities, none more important than the stationing of Aegis Ashore. The basis of the 
decision of where to implant the Aegis facility through the lens of domestic politics 
revealed an important difference with each leader. The distinction between each 
president’s actions is important in understanding the role an individual can have in global 
affairs while predisposed to domestic constraints and partisan influences. Russia’s 
perceptions based on the construction of a Russian identity rooted in culture and history 
determine Russia’s actions in the same ways as Romania and the United States.  
While one cannot be assured as to what the current administration will do 
concerning NATO and European affairs, one can be confident that these issues will 
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remain at the forefront of global politics. As nationalism rises and terrorist attacks 
threaten the security and status quo of democratic nations, leaders will continue to choose 
paths that offer the best option of security for their people. These choices are based on 
history and culture, and the leaders, military, and populace must understand the 
underlying motivations of a nation’s actions in order to ensure this century is better than 
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